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DEAD-Locked: Evaluating Judge-Imposed 
Death Sentences Under Missouri’s Death 
Penalty Statute 
Michael J. Essma* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 6, 2017, Judge Kelly Parker, a St. Charles County circuit 
judge in Missouri, sentenced Marvin Rice to death for the murder of his 
girlfriend, Annette Durham.1  Parker’s  sentencing came in spite of eleven of 
twelve jurors voting to sentence Rice to life imprisonment instead.2  The jury 
found Rice guilty of first-degree murder for killing Durham and guilty of 
second-degree murder for killing Durham’s boyfriend – Steven Strotkamp.3  
With respect to the first-degree murder charge, the jury did not unanimously 
decide whether Rice should be sentenced to life without parole or death.4  The 
“deadlock” provision of Missouri’s death penalty scheme allows a judge to 
make the ultimate determination of life or death when the jury cannot reach a 
unanimous decision.5  Since all twelve members were not able to make a 
 
* B.A., University of South Carolina-Columbia, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2020; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2019–2020. Thanks to Professor Paul Litton for his assistance throughout the writing 
process and to the editors of the Missouri Law Review for their comments and 
feedback during the writing and editing process. Finally, thanks to Brittany Briggs for 
bringing this issue to my attention. 
 1. Robert Patrick, Judge in St. Charles County Sentences Former Dent County 




 2. Christine Byers, Jury Hung in Sentencing of Former Dent County Deputy 




 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018). 
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determination, the jury deadlocked, and the decision was ultimately made by 
Judge Parker.6   
Marvin Rice’s case is not unique in Missouri.  In 1994, Joseph Whitfield 
was also sentenced to death by a judge after the jury voted eleven-to-one in 
favor of life without parole.7  In fact, a jury has not sentenced anyone to death 
in Missouri since 2013.8  Overall, Missouri judges have imposed death 
sentences after a jury deadlock fifteen times since the provision was created 
in 1984.9 
These cases of judicially imposed death sentences are, however, unique 
in the United States.  Only Missouri and Indiana allow a judge to impose a 
death sentence after the jury deadlocks on the ultimate determination of 
whether to sentence a defendant to death.10  These two states authorize judge-
imposed death sentences because of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that 
allows judges to only make sentencing determinations.11  These cases emanate 
from the Sixth Amendment protection of a jury trial for criminal defendants.12  
Still, Eighth Amendment restrictions on implementation of the death penalty 
muddy the distinction between sentencing and findings of fact required to be 
made by a jury under the Sixth Amendment.  Since the consequences of the 
death penalty are the highest possible, people should be confident that the 
 
 6. Patrick, supra note 1.  Judge Kelly Parker faces re-election every 6 years. 
Kelly W. Parker, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Kelly_W._Parker 
[perma.cc/3TEQ-24S2] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).  During 2017, he was in the 
middle of his six-year term, and he did not face re-election until 2020. Id.  It should 
also be noted that he ran unopposed in his 2014 election. Id. 
 7. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).  However, the 
Missouri Supreme Court later overturned his death sentence.  Id. at 272.   
 8. Joseph C. Welling, Missouri’s Death Penalty Jury Deadlock Provision Is 
Unconstitutional, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/missouri-s-death-penalty-jury-
deadlock-provision-is-unconstitutional/article_a2b5f34a-4cf3-59a3-880d-
f52acfe9ee97.html [perma.cc/BD9B-3RYT]. Greene County Judge Thomas 
Mountjoy sentenced Craig Wood to death in 2018 for the rape and murder of ten-year-
old Hailey Owens after a jury deadlocked on the decision of life without parole or 
death. Harrison Keegan, Will Craig Wood’s Death Penalty Hold Up?, SPRINGFIELD 
NEWS-LEADER (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.news-
leader.com/story/news/crime/2018/01/11/craig-wood-executed-some-experts-have-
doubts/1021025001/[perma.cc/T7HB-NU5T]. Multiple other individuals were also 
sentenced to death by a judge before 2013. See McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328, 
336 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 9. Welling, supra note 8. 
 10. Missouri Supreme Court Grants New Sentencing Trial to Man Who Was 
Sentenced to Death Despite 11 Jurors’ Votes for Life, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://archive.deathpenaltyinfo.org/category/categories/states/missouri 
[perma.cc/STA4-2D4W] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
 11. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 
(2016). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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Missouri death penalty scheme provides defendants their constitutional 
protections.  Yet, many people question whether this is true.13 
This Note evaluates whether the Missouri death penalty scheme meets 
Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause requirements.  Part II explains the 
Missouri death penalty scheme, the Missouri Supreme Court’s conflicting 
interpretations of the scheme, and the confusion that has been created by this 
precedent.  Next, Part III dissects the Missouri Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in State v. Wood, which found the Missouri death penalty does not 
violate the Sixth Amendment.  Part IV addresses whether the weighing of 
aggravators and mitigators can ever be a sentencing factor.  Then, Part IV 
considers whether Missouri’s death penalty statute makes the weighing of 
aggravators and mitigators a factual finding, despite no constitutional 
requirement to do so.  Finally, Part IV argues that Missouri can and should fix 
its death penalty statute to leave no doubt that all constitutional protections 
are afforded to defendants in death penalty cases. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees “in all 
criminal prosecutions . . . a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . . .”14  
Further, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that a jury 
find each element of a crime “beyond a reasonable doubt.”15  These two 
safeguards for criminal defendants appear straightforward, but they become 
complicated when applied to “bifurcated trials,” which are used to impose the 
death penalty.  This Part examines U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the due 
process rights of defendants in death penalty cases and the Missouri Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of that precedent.  Section A will trace the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s precedent by first analyzing its interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment.  Then, the unique statutory scheme required by the Supreme 
Court for death penalty statutes will be explained, including the meaning of 
“bifurcated trial.”  Finally, Section A will examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
application of its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to its death penalty 
jurisprudence.  Section B will then focus on the Missouri death penalty and 
the Missouri Supreme Court’s application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
A.  “Endors[ing] the Incoherence”16: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Confusing Capital Jurisprudence 
In his concurrence in Marsh v. Kansas, Justice Antonin G. Scalia 
described the U.S. Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence as “incoherent” and 
 
 13. See Welling, supra note 8 (“Missouri can and must do better.”); Keegan 
supra note 8 (“The whole idea of the Sixth Amendment is that a jury of your peers 
makes that judgment call.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359–60 (1970).   
 16. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 182 (2006) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
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stated that he did “not endorse that incoherence” before making a decision in 
accordance with that confusing jurisprudence.17  The Supreme Court’s 
incoherent capital jurisprudence evolved from a unique intersection between 
Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment18 and 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.19  The increased protections for 
capital defendants under the Eighth Amendment have, in turn, created new 
due process protections for capital defendants.  This Part will explain how the 
Eighth Amendment has impacted due process protections and analyze the 
current state of U.S. Supreme Court due process protections in capital cases.  
This Part will first detail the Supreme Court’s due process protections for 
criminal defendants in non-capital cases.  Then, it will lay out the special 
protections guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment in capital cases.  Finally, 
this Part will explain how the two interact by analyzing the most recent cases. 
1.  “By a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”20 
Along with incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to 
the states,21 the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime be found beyond a reasonable doubt.22  
While this requirement seems clear, there persisted – and persists – doubt as 
to what qualifies as a fact necessary to constitute the crime charged, also 
referred to as an element.  The Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey attempted to 
explain what constituted an element of the crime charged.23   
In Apprendi, the defendant “fired several shots into the home of an 
African-American family and made a statement – which he later retracted – 
that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race.”24  
The defendant then pleaded guilty to second-degree possession of a firearm 
for an unlawful purpose under New Jersey law, carrying a sentence of five to 
ten years.25  Following the guilty plea, the prosecutor then sought to enhance 
the sentence based on the state’s hate crime statute, which provided for an 
enhanced sentence if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate the group 
because of race.26  The judge found the crime was racially motivated and 
enhanced the defendant’s sentence to twelve years.27   
 
 17. Id.  
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 20. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 107 (2013). 
 21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146 (1968). 
 22. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).   
 23. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000). 
 24. Id.   
 25. Id. at 468. 
 26. Id. at 466. 
 27. Id. 
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On appeal, Apprendi claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause required the finding that the crime was racially motivated to 
be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.28  New Jersey argued that the 
state’s enhancement for racially motivated crimes was a sentencing factor and 
not an element of the crime charged.29  While an element is necessary to prove 
guilt or innocence, a sentencing factor “help[s] to determine the sentence 
imposed upon one who has been found guilty.”30  The Court rejected the 
State’s argument, holding, “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”31   
The Court decided that the New Jersey statute, which enhanced 
sentences for racially motivated crimes, was an element of the crime and not 
a sentencing factor because it increased the maximum sentence.32  Further, the 
Court noted that the inquiry of the elemental nature is “one not of form, but 
of effect – does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater 
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”33  Therefore, 
the Court held that the New Jersey sentencing enhancement for racially 
motivated crimes must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because 
it was an element and not a sentencing factor.34  This framework for deciding 
when due process rights of a jury trial requiring proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt attach seems straightforward until considering the special protections 
provided in capital punishment cases. 
2.  Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Bifurcated Trial 
While the U.S. Supreme Court developed its jurisprudence on due 
process protections for criminal defendants, it also revolutionized its death 
penalty jurisprudence.  First, the Supreme Court held Georgia’s death penalty 
scheme – and by proxy all other death penalty schemes – violated the Eighth 
Amendment.35  Justice Stewart ultimately concluded “that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death 
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so 
freakishly imposed.”36  However, the Supreme Court upheld the Georgia 
statute four years later when Georgia used a bifurcated trial for death 
sentences.37 
 
 28. Id. at 471. 
 29. Id. at 492. 
 30. Id. at 559 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 490. 
 32. Id. at 492. 
 33. Id. at 494. 
 34. Id. at 497. 
 35. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 36. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring). 
 37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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Under the bifurcated procedure, the trial had two phases: a guilt phase 
and a sentencing phase.38  If the jury found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt in the guilt phase, then the trial would move to the 
sentencing phase where the jury was required to consider mitigating and 
aggravating evidence.39  Aggravating evidence is evidence that increases the 
guilt of the crime, and mitigating evidence is evidence that reduces the moral 
culpability of the person committing the crime.40  Further, the jury was 
required to find the existence of at least one aggravating factor – out of ten 
possible aggravating factors – beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury could 
sentence the defendant to death.41  The judge was then bound by the jury’s 
recommended sentence – either death or life without parole.42  The statute also 
provided for “special expedited direct review by the Supreme Court of 
Georgia of the appropriateness of imposing the sentence of death in the 
particular case.”43  While Georgia laid out a template for death penalty statutes 
that did not violate the Eighth Amendment, there still remained uncertainty as 
to what due process rights were required in the sentencing phase. 
3.  The Supreme Court Puts a Ring On It 
In Walton v. Arizona, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not 
require a jury determination of facts during the sentencing phase because the 
facts in the sentencing phase – such as the existence of aggravating or 
mitigating factors – were sentencing considerations and not elements of the 
crime.44  After the Court held in Apprendi that “any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt,”45 the Court 
revisited Arizona’s death penalty scheme in Ring v. Arizona.46 
The Arizona death penalty scheme – like the one in Gregg – was a 
bifurcated proceeding with the first stage consisting of a guilt determination 
and the second stage being a sentencing phase.47  However, unlike Gregg, the 
sentencing phase was conducted before the court alone, and the judge alone 
made the factual determinations required to impose a sentence of death, 
including the determination of the existence of at least one aggravating 
circumstance.48  The Court held that “[c]apital defendants, no less than 
 
 38. Id. at 163–64. 
 39. Id. at 165. 
 40. Aggravating Circumstance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); 
Mitigator, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 41. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165–66. 
 42. Id. at 166. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990). 
 45. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 46. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 47. Id. at 592. 
 48. Id. at 592–93. 
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noncapital defendants . . . [were] entitled to a jury determination of any fact 
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum 
punishment.”49 
In so holding, the Court invalidated Arizona’s death penalty scheme.50  
The Court reasoned that the maximum punishment Ring could have received 
due to the jury’s finding of guilt was life imprisonment.51  Therefore, the 
finding of an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase was a fact on which 
the legislature conditioned an increase in the maximum punishment.52  Under 
this scheme, the finding of aggravators acted as elements, and aggravators 
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.53  The Court further 
emphasized that Apprendi considered the question of whether a finding is a 
sentencing consideration or an element was “one not of form, but of effect.”54  
Therefore, while Arizona tried to construe the finding of an aggravator as a 
sentencing factor, it was an element because finding an aggravator was 
necessary to increase the maximum punishment from life without parole to 
death.55 
4.  Revisiting Ring 
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited Ring in Hurst v. Florida.56  In 
Hurst, the Court heard a challenge to Florida’s death penalty scheme that 
required the jury to issue an “advisory verdict,” that was ultimately not 
binding on the trial judge.57  The Court decided the advisory verdict by the 
jury was not a necessary factual finding, and therefore, “[a] jury’s mere 
recommendation [wa]s not enough.”58  Writing in broader terms than Ring, 
the Court emphasized that the importance lay on the fact that without the 
judge’s findings, Hurst could not have been sentenced to death.59 
In so holding, the Court overruled two prior decisions – both before Ring 
– that affirmed Florida’s death penalty scheme: Spaziano v. Florida60 and 
Hildwin v. Florida.61  In Spaziano, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to 
death despite a jury recommended sentence of life without parole.62  The 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not guarantee a right to a jury 
 
 49. Id. at 589. 
 50. Id. at 609. 
 51. Id. at 597. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 599. 
 54. Id. at 602 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)). 
 55. Id. at 604–05 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494). 
 56. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 57. Id. at 622. 
 58. Id. at 619. 
 59. Id. at 622. 
 60. 468 U.S. 557 (1984). 
 61. 490 U.S. 638 (1989). 
 62. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 458. 
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determination on whether to impose death or life without parole.63  In Hurst, 
the Court specifically held that Spaziano was “overruled to the extent [it] 
allow[ed] a sentencing judge to find an aggravating circumstance, 
independent of a jury’s factfinding, that is necessary for the imposition of the 
death penalty.”64  Some believed the Court only required a jury find the 
existence of an aggravating factor for the Florida death penalty scheme to 
comply with Ring,65 but others read Hurst more broadly to also apply to the 
weighing of aggravators and mitigators.66 
B.  The Missouri Death Penalty Scheme 
Much like other state death penalty schemes, the Missouri death penalty 
scheme has evolved in light of U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  This Section will first detail Missouri’s current death penalty 
statute.  Then, it will review Missouri Supreme Court interpretations of the 
death penalty statute and the court’s application of Ring to it.  Further, this 
Section will point out some of the inconsistencies of the Missouri Supreme 
Court’s decisions. 
1.  Missouri’s Death Penalty Statute 
The Missouri death penalty scheme is unique because it phrases the 
sentencing phase in terms of what is necessary to impose a life sentence.67  
The Missouri statute states: 
The trier shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment 
without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the 
governor: 
(1) If the trier finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant is intellectually disabled; or 
(2) If the trier does not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one 
of the statutory aggravating circumstances set out in subsection 2 
of section 565.032; or 
(3) If the trier concludes that there is evidence in mitigation of 
punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the 
statutory mitigating circumstances listed in subsection 3 of section 
 
 63. Id. at 464.   
 64. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624. 
 65. Maria T. Kolar, “Finding” a Way to Complete the Ring of Capital Jury 
Sentencing, 95 DENV. L. REV. 671, 714 (2018). 
 66. Janet C. Hoeffel, Death Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 70 ARK. L. REV. 267, 
294 (2017). 
 67. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018). 
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565.032, which is sufficient to outweigh the evidence in 
aggravation of punishment found by the trier; or 
(4) If the trier decides under all of the circumstances not to assess 
and declare the punishment of death. If the trier is a jury it shall 
be so instructed.68 
Therefore, if a jury decides affirmatively to any of these four questions, 
the death penalty will not be imposed on the defendant.69  For example, if a 
jury answered affirmatively that they did not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
the existence of at least one aggravating factor, the defendant would receive a 
life sentence. 
There is another provision of the Missouri death penalty statute known 
as the “deadlock” jury provision.70  The deadlock jury provision provides that 
if the jury cannot decide on any of the questions – an inability of the jury to 
unanimously vote yes or no – then the court will decide to impose life without 
parole or death.71  In doing so, the judge follows the same procedure – 
explained above – as the jury.72  Clearly – following Ring – the judge could 
not impose a death sentence if the jury deadlocked on the existence of an 
aggravating factor; however, it is not as clear that the weighing test or decision 
to impose death must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Naturally, these questions have been raised before the Missouri Supreme 
Court. 
2.  The Missouri Supreme Court’s Conflicting Post-Ring Decisions 
and Its Impact 
The questions raised on the constitutionality of Missouri’s death penalty 
statute were not originally met with much clarity.  This Part begins by 
analyzing the Missouri Supreme Court’s first attempt to answer concerns 
about the constitutionality of Missouri’s death penalty scheme after Ring.  
Then, it examines the Missouri Supreme Court’s curious backpedal on its 
original determination.  Finally, this Part discusses the difficulty the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s post-Ring cases provided for the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri in reaching conflicting results on similar 
challenges to the Missouri death penalty statute.   
a.  State v. Whitfield 
Less than a year after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring, the 
Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Whitfield, heard a challenge to the 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Welling, supra note 8. 
 71. § 565.030.4. 
 72. Id. 
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constitutionality of Missouri’s death penalty statute based on Ring.73  While 
the Missouri death penalty had the same scheme as the current statute, there 
were a few differences in reference to the first two steps.74  The first step in 
the statute at issue in Whitfield was the same as what Missouri now labels step 
two – the finding of at least one aggravating factor.75  The second step required 
an imposition of life without parole “[i]f the trier does not find that the 
evidence in aggravation of punishment, including but not limited to evidence 
supporting the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in subsection 2 of 
section 565.032, warrants imposing the death sentence.”76 
In Whitfield, the jury was split eleven-to-one in favor of life 
imprisonment.77  Since the jury could not reach a unanimous decision, the 
determination was left to the judge, who ultimately imposed the death 
penalty.78  Whitfield challenged this procedure as a violation of  Ring, which 
requires a “jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions 
an increase in their maximum punishment.”79  The court agreed with 
Whitfield and decided that the judge had made improper factual 
determinations in this case.80  The court held that the first three steps 
constituted factual findings that fell within the province of the jury.81  In so 
holding, the court rejected the State’s arguments that steps two and three 
constituted the jury’s “subjective and discretionary opinion.”82  Instead, the 
court explained that the first three steps were “prerequisites to the trier of 
fact’s determination that a defendant is death-eligible.”83  Therefore, the first 
three steps were facts necessary to enhance the maximum sentence.84  Finally, 
the court noted that only in the fourth step was the jury given discretion to 
make the ultimate determination of life without parole or death.85 
Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, however, disagreed with the majority’s 
application of Ring to the Missouri death penalty scheme and dissented.86  
Judge Limbaugh agreed with the majority that steps one and two required 
factual findings, but he believed that step three did not require factual 
findings.87  Judge Limbaugh first noted that step three called for “a wholly 
 
 73. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), abrogated by State 
v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 74. Id. at 258 (quoting MO REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2000)). 
 75. Id.   
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 261.   
 78. Id.   
 79. Id. (quoting Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002)). 
 80. Id. at 261–62. 
 81. Id. at 261. 
 82. Id. at 259. 
 83. Id. at 261. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 275 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 277 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting). 
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subjective and discretionary analysis,”88  and then added that while steps one 
and two called for findings, step three required the jurors to come to a 
conclusion.89  He thought this distinction in wording made step three an 
exercise in judgment and not a factual finding.90  Additionally, Judge 
Limbaugh noticed that a finding in favor of the defendant on step three acted 
“only to decrease the punishment, subjecting an otherwise death-eligible 
defendant to life imprisonment.”91  Finally, Judge Limbaugh would have 
upheld the death sentence because the jury form provided that failure to make 
a unanimous decision in steps one and two resulted in life imprisonment.92  
Therefore, the jury made the necessary factual determinations in steps one and 
two, and the judge was allowed to make the discretionary sentencing decisions 
of steps three and four.93 
b.  The Backpedal 
While the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in Whitfield made a clear 
determination that the first three steps constituted fact finding, the court later 
chipped away at its own holding in State v. Glass94 and State v. Zink.95  In 
Glass, the court held that “[n]othing in Whitfield or in section 560.030.4 
requires the jury to make the findings in the last two steps beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”96  The court noted that Whitfield just required a jury determination for 
steps two and three, not a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.97  In Zink, the 
court went even further, stating that neither of the last two steps “require[d] a 
finding of a fact that may increase Mr. Zink’s penalty.”98  The court decided 
that the last two steps do not need to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.99 
The Missouri Supreme Court’s backpedal in Glass and Zink has led to 
curious results.  In fact, two judges on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri dealt with challenges to the constitutionality of Missouri’s 
statute on habeas review, and they reached seemingly conflicting results.100 
 
 88. Id. (Limbaugh, J. dissenting) (citing State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417, 430 
(Mo. 1983)). 
 89. Id. at 278 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting). 
 90. Id. (Limbaugh, J. dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 279 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 279 (Limbaugh, J. dissenting). 
 93. Id. (Limbaugh, J. dissenting). 
 94. State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. 2004) (en banc). 
 95. State v. Zink, 278 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 96. Glass, 136 S.W.3d at 521. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 193. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Steele, 173 F. Supp. 3d 855, 891 (E.D. Mo. 2016); 
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c.  Pick Your Precedent: The Federal Eastern District of Missouri Split 
The limited scope of review on habeas corpus proved particularly 
challenging for federal district courts when they recently reviewed the 
Missouri death penalty scheme in McLaughlin v. Steele101 and Johnson v. 
Steele.102  Both opinions reflect the difficulty in determining the nature of the 
weighing test in Missouri’s death penalty scheme, given inconsistent Missouri 
Supreme Court precedent. 
In McLaughlin, Judge Catherine D. Perry overturned McLaughlin’s 
death sentence – which was imposed by a judge after the jury deadlocked – 
on habeas review.103  Judge Perry first noted that the Missouri Supreme Court 
decided in Whitfield that the weighing of aggravators and mitigators was a 
factual finding and that, as a federal court reviewing a state court’s decision, 
she was bound by the state court’s interpretation of state law.104  Further, since 
the weighing was a factual finding, the jury had to unanimously find that the 
mitigators did not outweigh the aggravators.105   
Judge Perry concluded that it could not be determined whether the jury 
deadlocked on the weighing step because the question on the jury form asked 
only if the jury unanimously did not find that the mitigators outweighed the 
aggravators.106  In other words, there was no way of knowing what the jury 
found, only what the jury did not find.107  This means that it was not certain if 
some jurors found the mitigators outweighed the aggravators while others did 
not.108  All that was clear was that not all of the jurors found the mitigators 
outweighed the aggravators.109  Judge Perry concluded that in order for the 
judge to impose the death penalty under Ring, the jury had to unanimously 
find that the mitigators did not outweigh the aggravators.110  Since this could 
not be determined, Ring prohibited the judge from imposing the death 
sentence in McLaughlin.111 
While Judge Perry required a unanimous jury finding on the weighing 
step, Judge Limbaugh rejected the argument that the weighing step needed to 
be found beyond a reasonable doubt in Johnson v. Steele.112  In Johnson, the 
jury sentenced the defendant to death.113  Therefore, it was clear the jury had 
 
 101. 173 F. Supp. 3d 855 (E.D. Mo. 2016). 
 102. No. 4:13-CV-2046, 2018 WL3008307 (E.D. Mo. June 15, 2018). 
 103. McLaughlin, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 891. 
 104. Id. at 893. 
 105. Id. at 894. 
 106. Id. at 896. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Johnson, 2018 WL3008307 at *23. 
 113. Id. at *21. 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/11
2020] JUDGE-IMPOSED DEATH SENTENCES 283 
unanimously found the mitigators did not outweigh the aggravators;114 
however, Johnson argued that the jury needed to make that finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt.115  Judge Limbaugh rejected this argument because the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh allowed states to set up the weighing of 
aggravators and mitigators test however they wanted, including shifting the 
burden to the defendant to prove that mitigators outweighed aggravators.116   
Further, Judge Limbaugh rejected Johnson’s argument that the weighing 
test was an element of the offense of capital murder that Ring required be 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.117  Judge Limbaugh reasoned that 
the Missouri Supreme Court did not interpret the weighing test as an element 
of the crime because it did not require it be found beyond a reasonable doubt 
in Glass.118  The lone dissenter in Whitfield, Judge Limbaugh, acknowledged 
that the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding – that the weighing test was an 
element – conflicted with the holdings in Glass and Zink.119  Ultimately, Judge 
Limbaugh decided it was “clear that Whitfield d[id] not stand for the 
proposition that the weighing ‘fact’ at step three [wa]s a fact necessary to 
increase the range of punishment” because the Missouri Supreme Court did 
not require the weighing test to be found beyond a reasonable doubt in Zink 
and Glass.120  Therefore, because states have discretion to shift the burden of 
proof of the weighing test to defendants and Missouri interpreted its statute to 
say the weighing test was not an element, Judge Limbaugh found that the 
Missouri Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law.121   
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In 2019, the Missouri Supreme Court revisited Whitfield and the 
subsequent conflicting opinions.122  In State v. Wood, the court finally took 
the opportunity to formally overrule Whitfield’s determination that the 
weighing step was a factual finding.123  Three judges, however, dissented from 
the majority’s decision that the weighing step was not a factual finding.124  
This Part will discuss the majority’s decision and then explain the dissent. 
 
 114. Id. at *23. 
 115. Id. at *21. 
 116. Id. (citing Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 170–71 (2006)). 
 117. Id. at *22. 
 118. Id. (citing State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 521 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)). 
 119. Id. at *23. 
 120. Id. at *22. 
 121. Id. at *23. 
 122. State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 581–90 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 123. Id. at 586. 
 124. Id. at 596–599 (Stith, J. dissenting). 
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A.  State v. Wood 
In 2017, a jury found Craig Wood guilty of murdering ten-year-old 
Hailey Owens.125  The jury then unanimously determined beyond a reasonable 
doubt that six aggravating factors existed but deadlocked on the weighing 
step.126  Judge Thomas Mountjoy found the aggravating factors outweighed 
the mitigating factors and sentenced Wood to death.127  Wood appealed and 
argued that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated because the 
weighing step was a factual finding reserved for the jury, not the judge.128 
Writing for the majority, Judge Zel M. Fischer found that the weighing 
step in the Missouri death penalty statute was not a factual finding required to 
be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.129  First, Judge Fischer 
explained that Ring established the existence of aggravating factors to be a 
factual finding that must be made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.130  
Further, Hurst was merely a straightforward application of Ring, “stand[ing] 
only for the proposition that, in a jury tried case, aggravating circumstances 
are facts that must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”131  
Therefore, Hurst did not expand the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Ring to 
also include the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.132 
Additionally, Judge Fischer reasoned that the weighing of aggravating 
and mitigating factors is a discretionary decision that is a “question of 
mercy.”133  While the jury could provide a “factually verifiable answer” 
regarding the existence of aggravating factors, “[n]either a jury nor a judge 
can prove or disprove a conclusion the evidence on one side outweighs the 
evidence on the other.”134  Therefore, the decision that the brutality of Wood’s 
crime outweighed his personal circumstances was discretionary and not 
required to be found by a jury.135 
Finally, the majority acknowledged that Whitfield “suggested” the 
weighing step was a factual finding, but they overruled Whitfield “[t]o the 
extent that [it] presume[d] the weighing step [was] a factual finding 
constitutionally reserved for the jury.”136  In doing so, he noted that the 
 
 125. Id. at 571–73. 
 126. Id. at 582–83. 
 127. Harrison Keegan & Giacomo Bologna, Craig Wood Sentenced to Death 
Penalty for Killing Hailey Owens, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/crime/2018/01/11/craig-wood-sentenced-
death-penalty-killing-hailey-owens/1020415001/ [perma.cc/MM5J-7TJB]. 
 128. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 582. 
 129. Id. at 585. 
 130. Id. at 583. 
 131. Id. at 584. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 584 (citing Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016)). 
 134. Id. at 585. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 586–87. 
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Missouri Supreme Court’s most recent decisions found the weighing step was 
not a factual finding.137  Indeed, the court’s decisions in Zink, Anderson, 
Dorsey, and Nunley all contradict Whitfield, although not explicitly.  In 
conclusion, Judge Fischer held that neither Missouri’s statute nor the U.S. 
Constitution made the weighing step a factual finding required to be found by 
the jury.138 
B.  The Dissent 
In her dissent, Judge Laura Denvir Stith agreed with the majority that the 
fourth step was not a factual finding, and she did not disagree with the 
majority’s decision that the U.S. Constitution did not always require the 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors to be found by a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt.139  Instead, Judge Stith believed the Missouri statute made 
the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors at the third step a factual 
finding.140  Judge Stith recognized the majority opinion’s interpretation of the 
third step would leave the fourth step superfluous.141  Indeed, the majority’s 
declaration that the third step is a “question of mercy” would make the fourth 
step, which actually allows the jury to grant mercy considering all of the 
circumstances, redundant.142  While both steps allow the jury to balance 
evidence, the third step narrows the evidence the jury may consider, making 
it a factual finding as opposed to a solely discretionary decision.143  
Furthermore, unlike the majority, Judge Stith believed that asking a jury to 
balance evidence could be a factual finding because courts frequently ask the 
jury to balance evidence.144  For example, one of the court’s standards of 
review asks whether the jury verdict is “against the weight of evidence.”145  
This standard of review acknowledges that juries are constantly asked to 
weigh evidence, and they may factually err in the weight they assign the 
evidence.146  Therefore, the statute can and does require the jury to make a 
factual determination on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
evidence.147 
 
 137. Id. at 585–87. 
 138. Id. at 588. 
 139. Id. at 598 (Stith, J. dissenting). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 599. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
As has often been repeated, “[D]eath is different . . . .”148  Thus far, this 
Note has outlined how Eighth Amendment concerns with the implementation 
of the death penalty essentially created Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights for death penalty defendants.  This led to the “incoherence” of 
determining what constitutional requirements are necessary to carry out the 
death penalty.  Missouri represents a perfect example of the difficulty states 
face in interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court’s tricky jurisprudence.  This Part 
begins by reviewing the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision that the Sixth 
Amendment does not require the third step of the Missouri death penalty 
statute to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  To do that, it will 
first evaluate whether the Sixth Amendment mandates the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors always be a factual finding.  Then, this Part 
will address Judge Stith’s contention that the form of the statute – not the Sixth 
Amendment – makes the weighing step in Missouri’s statute a factual finding.  
Finally, this Part takes a policy-oriented view and suggests that Missouri 
should end judicial death sentences altogether. 
A.  Can the Weighing Test Be A Sentencing Factor? 
As previously mentioned, Ring and Hurst expressly prohibit the judge in 
a jury trial from imposing death based on his or her findings on the existence 
of aggravating factors.149  Neither case, however, directly addresses whether 
the balancing of aggravators and mitigators is always a factual finding or if it 
can be a sentencing factor.  While the Missouri Supreme Court found that the 
Sixth Amendment allowed the weighing of aggravators and mitigators to be a 
sentencing factor, different courts and scholars believe that U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent suggests weighing tests must be factual findings.150  Courts 
and scholars arrived at that interpretation through different means.  Some 
believe that Hurst extended the Supreme Court’s holding in Ring to cover 
more than just the existence of aggravators.  Others use older cases to argue 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has de facto made the weighing of aggravators 
and mitigators necessary to impose the death penalty, effectively making 
weighing tests factual findings.  This Section will address both arguments by 
first determining whether Hurst expanded, or just narrowly affirmed, Ring.  
Then, this Section will evaluate other interpretations, specifically looking at a 
2016 decision from the Supreme Court of Delaware. 
 
 148. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
 149. See supra Parts II.A.3–4. 
 150. Ex parte Bohannon, 222 So.3d 525, 529–30 (Al. 2016) (holding that 
weighing aggravators and mitigators is not a fact finding required to be made by a jury 
because once an aggravating factor was found the defendant was death-eligible, 
requiring no other findings to be sentenced to death). 
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1.  Hurst: The Same Old Thing 
While the Missouri Supreme Court in Wood believed Hurst was merely 
a straightforward application of Ring,151 some courts and commentators have 
opined that Hurst’s broad language suggests an expansion of Ring.152  Indeed, 
the Court’s phrasing of the central holdings in Ring and Hurst differed subtly.  
First, Ring held that a jury, not a judge, must be the one “to find an aggravating 
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”153  This holding 
made it clear that the Sixth Amendment applied to finding aggravators.  
However, the Court in Hurst held, “The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not 
a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a death sentence.”154  Professor 
Hessick from the North Carolina School of Law and Professor Berry from the 
Mississippi School of Law believe Hurst’s broader phrasing actually 
expanded Ring’s holding.155  Essentially, they argue that the holding in Ring 
limited the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement to findings in the narrowing 
stage.156   
As explained by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Supreme Court precedent on 
death penalty decision-making can be broken down into two requirements: the 
narrowing requirement and the selection decision.157  The narrowing 
requirement refers to the requirement that the death penalty scheme must 
“genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must 
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant 
compared to others found guilty of murder.”158  The narrowing requirement 
may be met by the finding of aggravators.  A defendant is not constitutionally 
eligible to receive the death penalty until aggravators are found.  Therefore, 
Ring stood for the proposition that the jury had to find the facts necessary to 
make the defendant death-eligible but said nothing about the selection 
decision.   
The selection decision “determines whether a death-eligible defendant 
should actually receive the death penalty.”159  This decision requires 
mitigating evidence to be considered to allow for an individualized 
 
 151. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 584. 
 152. See e.g., Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 436 (Del. 2016) (Strine, J., concurring) 
(finding Hurst’s mandate that a jury must make all of the factual findings necessary 
to impose death includes a jury’s role in selecting the death penalty as well as the 
determination of death eligibility); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & William W. 
Berry III, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 66 UCLA L. REV. 448, 464–76 
(2019).   
 153. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
 154. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016). 
 155. Hessick & Berry III, supra note 152, at 464–75. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Hidalgo v. Arizona, 138 S. Ct. 1054, 1054 (2018). 
 158. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 159. Id. 
17
Essma: DEAD-Locked
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
288 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
determination.160  Thus, to Professors Hessick and Berry, Hurst’s broad 
language encompasses the selection decision because death penalty statutes 
necessarily require consideration of mitigators – like Missouri’s weighing step 
– before imposition of the death penalty.161  This makes the weighing step a 
fact necessary to increase punishment.  Under this reading of Hurst, every step 
of the Missouri death penalty statute would have to be found by a jury because 
they are all required to impose the death penalty.  Indeed, Professors Hessick 
and Berry confirm this with a cursory analysis of the Missouri statute.162   
However, this reading of Hurst overlooks key aspects of the decision.  
First, the Florida statute struck down in Hurst made all the jury’s findings 
mere recommendations.163  This included the jury’s findings on aggravators, 
giving the judge sole discretion on finding of aggravators.164  Therefore, a 
straightforward interpretation of Ring would have struck down the Florida 
death penalty statute.  In other words, the Court did not need to expand Ring 
to reach the same outcome.  Furthermore, as explained by the Missouri 
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hurst overruled prior decisions 
upholding the Florida death penalty statute “to the extent they allow a 
sentencing judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury’s 
factfinding, that is necessary for imposition of the death penalty.”165  In sum, 
the central holding of Hurst was written broadly, but the Court clearly limited 
the extent to which it overruled past cases and never suggested that the 
selection decision required a jury determination.  Still, Chief Justice Leo E. 
Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the same reading in his 
concurrence in Rauf v. State, but he expanded on the implications of the 
interaction between the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.166   
2.  “[V]oila, a Sixth Amendment [R]ight [I]s [C]reated”167 
Chief Justice Strine’s concurring opinion emphasized the necessity of 
both the narrowing requirement and the selection decision in imposing the 
death sentence.168  Essentially, Chief Justice Strine explained that the U.S. 
Supreme Court placed requirements on death penalty schemes in order to 
comply with the Eighth Amendment.169  For example, the Court’s precedent 
requires death penalty schemes to narrow the class of death-eligible 
defendants, often done with the jury finding aggravators and mitigators.170  
 
 160. Id. at 1054–55. 
 161. Hessick & Berry III, supra note 152, at 502. 
 162. Id. at 480. 
 163. Id. at 460–61. 
 164. Id. at 461. 
 165. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016). 
 166. Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 436 (Del. 2016) (Strine, C.J., concurring). 
 167. Id. at 476 (Strine, C.J., concurring).   
 168. Id. at 475–76.  
 169. Id. at 478–79.  
 170. Id. at 475–76.  
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/11
2020] JUDGE-IMPOSED DEATH SENTENCES 289 
This Eighth Amendment right created a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury 
find the aggravators because a defendant was not death-eligible without the 
finding of the existence of aggravators.171  As Chief Justice Strine put it, “By 
considering this a ‘fact finding’ essential to the imposition of a death sentence, 
voila, a Sixth Amendment right is created.”172   
Chief Justice Strine opined that this same reasoning extended to the 
selection decision.173  He explained that the Court, in a series of cases, 
required mitigators to be considered in order for death penalty schemes to 
comply with the Eighth Amendment.174  Therefore, “fact-findings beyond 
death-eligibility are not optional.”175  Since considering mitigators – which 
the Missouri death penalty accomplishes in its weighing step – is not optional, 
it is a fact necessary to impose the death penalty and the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury determination should apply.176 
In reaching his decision, Chief Justice Strine overlooked the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s distinction between the narrowing requirement and the 
selection decision.  To begin, the Court has often classified the selection 
decision as “individualized sentencing.”177  Furthermore, the Court has 
granted states significant discretion in how they allow the sentencer to 
consider mitigating evidence.178  From Apprendi to Hurst, the Court’s Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence has been concerned with distinguishing elements 
of a crime from sentencing factors.179  The Court has plainly accepted that the 
narrowing requirement involves an element of the crime of capital murder, 
but the selection decision does not have to be an element of the crime and 
could just be sentencing. 
Once a defendant is found death-eligible, presumably by a jury 
determination that one or more aggravators exist, the Constitution does not 
require any more factual findings to impose the death sentence.  Because the 
defendant is death-eligible, additional findings do not increase the range of 
punishment.  The consideration of mitigators reflects a constitutional 
requirement for conducting the sentencing once it has been determined that 
the defendant can receive the death penalty.  Based on this, a death penalty 
scheme could end the jury’s role once the jury found the existence of 
 
 171. Id. at 476. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.   
 174. Id. at 477. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.   
 177. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994); see also, Kansas v. Marsh, 
548 U.S. 163, 174 (2006) (“The use of mitigation evidence is a product of the 
requirement of individualized sentencing.”). 
 178. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 n.13 (1983) (“[S]pecific standards for 
balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances are not constitutionally 
required.”); see also Marsh, 548 U.S. 164–65 (finding that Kansas could impose the 
death penalty when the jury found the mitigators and aggravators were in “equipoise”). 
 179. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492 (2000). 
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aggravators.  However, some may want a death penalty scheme that provides 
more protection than the Sixth Amendment by making the consideration of 
mitigators a factual finding. 
B.  Does the Missouri Statute Make the Weighing Step a Factual 
Finding? 
While U.S. Supreme Court precedent allows states to structure their 
death penalty statute so that the balancing of aggravators and mitigators is a 
sentencing factor, many contend that states can design their death penalty 
statute so the weighing of aggravators and mitigators is a factual finding.  
States may, in fact, want to do this to provide defendants more protection of 
their right to a trial by jury than the Sixth Amendment.  Indeed, Judge Stith 
argued in her dissent in Wood that the Missouri statute did just that.  Still, the 
majority in Wood seemed to suggest the weighing of aggravators and 
mitigators could likely never be a factual finding because it is essentially a 
discretionary decision without a factually verifiable answer.  This Section 
analyzes both arguments by first deciding that states can structure weighing 
tests to be factual findings and then by evaluating whether Missouri structured 
its death penalty statute to provide criminal defendants these extra protections. 
1.  Factual Discretion 
Judge Fischer’s majority opinion – and to an extent, Judge Limbaugh’s 
dissent in Whitfield180 – suggested that the weighing of aggravators and 
mitigators may never be a factual finding.181  Citing to several U.S. Supreme 
Court cases, Judge Fischer explained that “the selection decision is a 
discretionary judgment.”182  Furthermore, Judge Fischer believed that the 
weighing of aggravators and mitigators could not be a factual finding because 
there was no “factually verifiable answer” to whether the mitigators 
outweighed the aggravators.183   
However, Judge Stith correctly explained that juries are often tasked 
with balancing and weighing evidence, such as determining the credibility of 
witnesses and resolving conflicts in testimony.184  Indeed, trademark law 
provides an excellent example of the trust placed in juries to weigh evidence 
to make a factual finding on an issue that may not have a “factually verifiable 
answer.”  To sue for trademark infringement, plaintiffs need to show a 
 
 180. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 277 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (Limbaugh, J. 
dissenting). 
 181. State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 584 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 585. 
 184. Id. at 598 (Stith, J. dissenting).   
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likelihood of confusion.185  The likelihood of confusion inquiry requires an 
evaluation of several factors, ranging from six to eight depending on the 
federal circuit.186  Those factors are then weighed against each other without 
any single factor being determinative.187  Most federal circuits consider both 
the finding of the factors and the weighing of the factors as questions of fact 
to be decided by the fact-finder, which can be a jury.188  There is no factually 
verifiable answer as to whether factors in any given case weigh in favor of 
likelihood of confusion, yet jurors may be trusted with making that 
determination.  A further example of difficult questions with no factually 
verifiable answers entrusted to juries is calculating damages for pain and 
suffering or wrongful death.189 
In sum, the U.S. legal system often trusts juries with tough 
determinations.  This may be a necessary result of the importance the U.S. 
Constitution places on the jury trial.  While there may not be a factually 
verifiable answer as to whether mitigators outweigh aggravators, several 
examples prove that there does not need to be a factually verifiable answer to 
make something a factual finding or element.  Therefore, a legislature could 
write a statute to make the weighing of mitigators and aggravators a factual 
finding.   
2.  Lost in Interpretation 
While it seems that states can make the weighing of aggravators and 
mitigators factual findings, the Missouri Supreme Court decided that the 
weighing step in Missouri’s statute is not a factual finding.190  However, in so 
holding, the court failed to adequately address Missouri’s statute in particular.  
Instead, the court relied on its post-Whitfield decisions that backpedaled from 
its interpretation of the weighing step as a factual finding.191  Those decisions 
clearly regarded the weighing step as a sentencing factor, but they too failed 
to analyze the Missouri statute in any great detail.192  Indeed, their failure to 
 
 185. JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 366–70. (LexisNexis 5th ed. 
2013).   
 186. Id.   
 187. Id.   
 188. Id. at 389–90.  The Second and Sixth Circuits consider the findings as to the 
factors to be questions of fact but consider the ultimate balancing of the factors to be 
a question of law. Id.  The Federal Circuit considers both to be questions of law. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Candler, 283 F. 881, 884 (8th Cir. 
1922). 
 190. State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 585 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 191. Id. 
 192. The majority relied on: Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 192–93 (Mo. 2009) 
(en banc); State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 540 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); State v. 
Dorsey, 318 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); and State v. Nunley 341 S.W.3d 
611, 626 n.3 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).  The court correctly explained that all of those 
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address the evolving interpretation of the Missouri statute since Whitfield 
forced Judge Fischer to expressly overrule Whitfield in Wood.  Had the issue 
been expressly resolved before Wood, Judge Fischer would not have 
conducted as thorough a Sixth Amendment analysis. 
Furthermore, Judge Stith’s dissent strongly contested the majority’s 
interpretation of the Missouri death penalty statute.193  Judge Stith primarily 
argued that understanding the third step as solely discretionary – as the 
majority did – made the fourth step superfluous.194  Indeed, the fourth step – 
which asks the jury to consider all evidence – calls for a discretionary decision 
by the jury, and a well-established rule of statutory interpretation is to not 
render parts of the statute superfluous.  In other words, there was no reason to 
include the fourth step after giving the jury the chance to exercise its discretion 
in the third step.  This approach, however, forgets the purpose behind the third 
step. 
As previously explained, the Eighth Amendment requires sentencers to 
have the opportunity to consider mitigating factors.195  The third step of 
Missouri’s statute merely complies with this Eighth Amendment mandate.  In 
complying with this mandate, the third step provides guided discretion in 
sentencing because it gives the sentencer specific factors to consider – the 
aggravators already found and the statutorily designated mitigators – but 
allows the sentencer discretion in decision-making.  This type of guided 
discretion was exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned would be 
necessary to comply with its limitations on the selection decision.  The fourth 
step, on the other hand, provides the sentencer an opportunity to exercise 
absolute discretion by requiring the jury to make a decision “under all of the 
circumstances.”196  The statute does not limit the sentencer in making the 
ultimate decision.   
Therefore, the third step is necessary to comply with the Eighth 
Amendment, but the question still remains: why allow the sentencer an 
opportunity for absolute discretion in the fourth step?  Perhaps, the Missouri 
General Assembly wanted to allow the sentencer to exercise residual doubt.  
Residual doubt is “any remaining or lingering doubt a jury has concerning the 
defendant’s guilt despite having been satisfied ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”197  Indeed, Missouri capital defense attorneys have seen the value of 
exploiting residual doubt to avoid the death penalty for their clients.198  
 
decisions considered the third step a factual finding, but those decisions failed to 
explain why they did so. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 585–86. 
 193. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 598 (Stith, J. dissenting). 
 194. Id.  
 195. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–97 (1976). 
 196. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018). 
 197. Jennifer R. Treadway, ‘Residual Doubt’ in Capital Sentencing: No Doubt It 
Is An Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1992).   
 198. See, e.g., Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 757 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (“At the 
motion hearing, defense counsel testified that their main strategy in the penalty phase 
was to focus on residual doubt concerning whether Barton was guilty of the crime.  
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Furthermore, residual doubt is not a mitigating factor in Missouri’s statute,199 
and the U.S. Supreme Court does not require the jury to be instructed on 
residual doubt at the penalty phase.200  This may reflect the Missouri General 
Assembly’s desire to allow sentencers to consider residual doubt in close 
cases while not explicitly directing the sentencer to consider residual doubt 
where it may not be applicable.  Therefore, because the Eighth Amendment 
requires consideration of mitigators and the Missouri General Assembly may 
want to allow jurors to consider residual doubt, the third step does not render 
the fourth step superfluous or vice-versa. 
Finally, the majority in Wood did not engage in statutory interpretation, 
but Judge Limbaugh’s dissent in Whitfield did.  Judge Limbaugh argued that 
the language of the statute indicated the weighing step asked the sentencer to 
exercise his or her judgment while the first two steps asked the jury to make 
a factual finding.201  The first two steps called for “findings,” whereas the third 
step called for a “conclusion.”202  This wording suggests that the third step 
asks something fundamentally different from the first two steps.203  
Accordingly, the language of the statute provides a convincing argument that 
the third step is not a factual finding like the first two.   
C.  Ending Judge-Imposed Death Sentences 
Thus far, this Note has questioned the constitutionality of allowing a 
judge to weigh aggravators and mitigators.  This of course is based on the U.S. 
Supreme Court drawing a distinction between elements of the crime and 
sentencing factors – a line that becomes especially muddled in death penalty 
cases.  Given what is at stake in death penalty cases, it is imperative that there 
be no doubt all constitutional protections are met.  An easy way to assure this 
is to require a jury to sentence a defendant to death and leave open no avenue 
for a judge to impose a death sentence on his or her own.  This approach is 
not without historical support. 
 
Counsel testified that it was their desire to avoid presenting witnesses whose testimony 
would have made it more likely that Barton committed the crime.”); see also Williams 
v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).   
 199. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032 (2018). 
 200. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173–77 (1988).   
 201. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 277 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (Limbaugh, J. 
dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 278. 
 203. It should be noted that the Missouri statute did not always refer to the third 
step as a conclusion.  In fact, the Missouri statute originally called for a “finding” at 
step three as well as steps one and two. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (1992) (amended 
1993).  However, the General Assembly revised the statute in 1993 to refer to the third 
step as a conclusion. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (1993).  It is not clear what brought 
about this change (this was still before Ring).  It is also not clear whether the third step 
would have been a factual finding under the 1992 statute, but Judge Limbaugh’s 
argument for it not being a factual finding would be significantly impaired.   
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Indeed, Professor John G. Douglass from the University of Richmond 
School of Law  noted, “Read in light of history, the constitutional text suggests 
that all of the rights we now associate with trial were intended to govern all 
of the proceedings that lead to a death sentence.”204  Professor Douglass 
arrived at this conclusion based on the unified nature of capital trials during 
and after the creation of the Sixth Amendment, where the jury made all 
determinations.205  Further, Professor Douglass noted the jury’s special role 
“as a form of popular resistance to unpopular laws.”206  Nowhere is this role 
for the jury more important than in capital cases, where support for the death 
penalty is anything but conclusive.207  Ultimately, an interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment requiring a jury make the determination of life or death is 
the most practical solution and is backed by significant historical support. 
Still, Missouri may choose to act on its own and revise its death penalty 
to only allow a jury to make the ultimate determination of life or death.  In 
fact, Missouri’s death penalty statute – as well as thirty-eight other states’ 
death penalty statutes – featured this requirement before Furman.208  
Restoring the power to the jury – and only the jury – to make the ultimate 
determination of life or death would avoid the appearance of impropriety left 
by a judge imposing death despite a jury voting eleven-to-one in favor of life 
without parole.  If Missouri legislators are concerned with the inevitable 
decrease in death sentences that such change may bring about, then they need 
only remember the role of the jury “as a form of popular resistance to 
unpopular laws.”209 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Missouri death penalty statute’s weighing step occupies a gray area 
between sentencing factor and factual finding.  The unique interaction 
between the Sixth and Eighth Amendments enhances this complexity.  
Despite interpreting the weighing step to be a factual finding in Whitfield, the 
Missouri Supreme Court recently overruled this holding in Wood.  However, 
the Wood decision lacks the necessary statutory interpretation to satisfactorily 
end the debate over the Missouri statute.  Given the importance of making the 
 
 204. See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at 
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 209. See Douglass, supra note 204, at 2022. 
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correct decision in a death penalty case, legislators would be wise to end 
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